The relationship between medical clinicians and patients is described as potentially tragic in nature and a context in which courage can be a relevant virtue. Danger, risk, uncertainty, and choice are presented as features of clinical relationships that also function as necessary conditions for courage. The clinician is seen as a ‘sustaining presence’ who has duties of ‘encouragement’ with respect to patients. The patient is seen to have a duty to learn the condition of human existence which can be discovered (...) in clinical relations and to develop the virtues necessary to a fitting negotiation of human life. Case examples of courage on the parts of the principal participants in the clinical encounter are provided. In addition, several goods for clinicians and patients as objects of courage are identified. Keywords: virtue, courage, tragedy, clinical medicine CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Theology and Bioethics. Earl E. Shelp, editor.

This paper discusses the neo-logicist approach to the foundations of mathematics by highlighting an issue that arises from looking at the Bad Company objection from an epistemological perspective. For the most part, our issue is independent of the details of any resolution of the Bad Company objection and, as we will show, it concerns other foundational approaches in the philosophy of mathematics. In the first two sections, we give a brief overview of the "Scottish" neo-logicist school, present a generic form (...) of the Bad Company objection and introduce an epistemic issue connected to this general problem that will be the focus of the rest of the paper. In the third section, we present an alternative approach within philosophy of mathematics, a view that emerges from Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899, Leipzig: Teubner; Foundations of geometry (trans.: Townsend, E.). La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1959.). We will argue that Bad Company-style worries, and our concomitant epistemic issue, also affects this conception and other foundationalist approaches. In the following sections, we then offer various ways to address our epistemic concern, arguing, in the end, that none resolves the issue. The final section offers our own resolution which, however, runs against the foundationalist spirit of the Scottish neo-logicist program. (shrink)

The paper discusses the active part in the process of perceiving, usually expressed by the Greek word krinein. It is argued that krinein in one of its uses means "to judge" in the sense of judging a case, i. e. deciding it. It is not used for making statements. A second meaning of the Greek word is that of discerning or discriminating, and it is this meaning that plays a central part in Aristotle's theory of perception.

This is a German translation with commentary of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, Book I. The introduction (‚Einleitung‘, pp. 97–182) contains a concise history of the reception of Aristotle’s syllogistic from Theophrastus to Kant and Hegel. The commentary places special attention to the modal chapters (i. e. I 3 and 8–22). Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is treated with more sympathy than in other modern commentaries and discussions of this part of Aristotle’s logic.

Kant’s Categorical Imperative (CI) is to be taken as a necessary and sufficient condition for any action that is permissible, i. e. not prohibited. The class of permissible actions contains actions which are allowed as well as those which are morally required. If to perform an action and to abstain from this action can be taken to be ‘practical opposites’, then an action that is morally required for, a duty, is an action whose practical opposite is prohibited, and vice versa. (...) The class of actions which are merely allowed (neither prohibited nor morally required for) contains all and only those actions who together with their practical opposites belong to the class of permissible (not prohibited) actions. The paper then adduces passages from Kant’s ethical writings on the CI supporting these distinctions. (shrink)

I try to show that Aristotle does not restrict 'praxis' to those activities which have their end in themselves. NE VI 5, 1140b6-7 need not to be taken as an argument in favour of the restricted interpretation: the wording of the passage is compatible with the interpretation that the end of a praxis is (another) praxis (e.g. eupraxia), the end of a poiesis on the other hand is never a poiesis. This interpretation fits better the use of 'praxis' throughout the (...) NE. MM A 34, 1197a4-12 is discarded since the MM is not written by Aristotle. Next I discuss the relation between the verbs 'prattein' and 'poiein' on the one hand and the corresponding nouns 'poiesis' and 'praxis' on the other, in order to determine their exact meaning. To conclude, Aristotle's distinctions are compared to certain tenets of H. Arendt in her 'Vita Activa'. (shrink)

This paper (1) criticizes Patzig's explanation of Aristotle's reason for calling his first figure syllogisms perfect syllogisms, i.e. the transitivity relation: it can only be used for Barbara, not for the other three moods. The paper offers (2) an alternative interpretation: It is only in the case of the (perfect) first figure moods that we can move from the subject term of the minor premiss, taken to be a predicate of an individual, to the predicate term of the major premiss. (...) This contention is supported (i) by Aristotle's wording of the dictum de omni et nullo and (ii) by Aristotle's use of a formula which puts the minor term in the first position when he first states Barbara and Celarent. (shrink)

The paper discusses Timaeus 27d5-29b1, i.e. part of the proem of Timaeus' lecture. This passage contains the exposition of three principles (27d5-28b2) and their application to certain questions intended to lay the foundations for the subsequent cosmology (28b2-29b1). I argue that one of the main results Timaeus wants to deduce from his principles, i.e. the claim that the cosmos has been constructed by a divine craftsman, is not warranted by his principles and rests on a rather conspicuous flaw in the (...) argument. I further discuss the question whether this mistake should be attributed to Plato or whether Plato deliberately has Timaeus commit this mistake; I argue for the second alternative. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the existence of a Dialectical school proper against criticisms brought forward by Klaus Döring and by Jonathan Barnes. Whereas Döring claims that there was no Dialectical school separate from the Megarians, Barnes takes issue with my claim (argued for in “Dialektiker und frühe Stoiker bei Sextus Empiricus”) that most of the reports in Sextus on the dialecticians refer to members of the Dialectical school. Barnes contends that these dialecticians are in fact Stoic logicians. As against (...) Döring, I argue that the passage in Diogenes Laertius II 113 (first drawn attention to by David Sedley) which talks of a the Megarian Stilpo winning over disciples from the Dialecticians is not refuted by Döring’s arguments. It clearly shows that the Dialecticians and the Megarians at the time were taken to be different philosophical sects. As against Barnes I insist on the differences between the report in Ps.-Galen’s Historia 9 and the Sextan report on the theory of sign in AM VIII. These reports offer incompatible definitions of the indicative sign. Moreover, the classification of simple propositions reported by Sextus at AM VIII 96f. cannot be a truncated version of the (Stoic) list to be found in Diogenes Laertius VII 69f. since in Sextus’ report one of the three classes of simple propositions is labelled middle (meson). This is a certain sign that we are dealing with a triad, and hence that this list is meant to be complete. Therefore the classification found in Sextus and attributed to the dialecticians and the one in Diogenes Laertius reporting Stoic material do come from different sources. (shrink)

The paper starts from a distinction between two terms in Aristotle: kategoroumenon and kategoria. It is argued that the job of the first is to pick out 'predicated predicates' (i.e. predicates attached to a specific subject), the job of the second is to designate 'predicable predicates' (terms which can be attached to specific subjects). It is then argued (1) that Aristotle's division of the (erroneously) so-called 'predicables' (i. e. genus, proprium, definiens, accident) is a classification of predicated predicates, (2) that (...) the list of the "genera of kategoriai" in Top. I 9 which starts with ti estin (essence) as its first member contains a classification of predicable predicates, and (3) that the list in Cat. 4 (starting with ousia, 'substance') is a classification not of kategoriai, but of things there are. (shrink)

The reason for Aristotle’s treatment of (traditional) fourth figure syllogisms as first figure syllogisms with inverted terms in the conclusion is the following: To disprove the conclusiveness of a premiss pair Aristotle formulates two triplets of true propositions such that two of them correspond to the premiss pair in question and that the third proposition corresponding to a conclusion is an a-proposition in the first case, an e-proposition in the other. Since the truth of an a-proposition grants the falsity of (...) the contrary e- and of the contradictory o-proposition, the first triplet offers two counter-instances for invalid syllogisms with true premisses and false conclusions. Similarly the true e-proposition grants the falsity of an a- and an i-conclusion. Since an a-proposition can be converted to an i-proposition and an e-proposition is equivalent to its converse, these first figure triplets also disprove any first figure syllogism with converted conclusions, with the exception of o-conclusions. The invalidity of the latter ones, however, can be shown by using premiss conversions of (invalid) second and third figure syllogisms. The proposed explanation also makes clear why there are no rejection proofs for invalid syllogisms of (traditional) fourth figure syllogisms in the Analytics. (shrink)

Why does Aristotle not use the copulative wording for categorical propositions, but instead the clumsier terminological formulations (e. g. the B belongs to every A) in his syllogistic? The proposed explanations by Alexander, Lukasiewicz and Patzig: Aristotle wants to make clear the difference between subject and predicate, seems to be insufficient. In quantified categorical propositions, this difference is always sufficiently clear by the use of the pronouns going with the subject expressions. Aristotle opts for the terminological wording because in premiss (...) pairs of figures two and three he can thus suppress the middle term in one of the premisses and connect the major and minor term, using connecting particles. This renders the syllogisms more transparent. Had he used the copulative wording instead, he would have run into difficulties, in particular with o-propositions among the premisses (i. e. in Baroco and Bocardo) because in these cases the pronoun expressing the quantification would have to go with the subject term, the negation with the predicate. (shrink)

Paul's concept of the “body,” so obscure for our modern way of thinking, nevertheless underlies the whole of his theology, and is decisive for understanding Paul's teaching on ethics, sacraments, ministry, and the Christian hope.

This thesis is concerned with explaining how a subject can acquire a priori knowledge of arithmetic. Every account for arithmetical, and in general mathematical knowledge faces Benacerraf's well-known challenge, i.e. how to reconcile the truths of mathematics with what can be known by ordinary human thinkers. I suggest four requirements that jointly make up this challenge and discuss and reject four distinct solutions to it. This will motivate a broadly Fregean approach to our knowledge of arithmetic and mathematics in general. (...) Pursuing this strategy appeals to the context principle which, it is proposed, underwrites a form of Platonism and explains how reference to and object-directed thought about abstract entities is, in principle, possible. I discuss this principle and defend it against different criticisms as put forth in recent literature. Moreover, I will offer a general framework for implicit definitions by means of which - without an appeal to a faculty of intuition or purely pragmatic considerations - a priori and non-inferential knowledge of basic mathematical principles can be acquired. In the course of this discussion, I will argue against various types of opposition to this general approach. Also, I will highlight crucial shortcomings in the explanation of how implicit definitions may underwrite a priori knowledge of basic principles in broadly similar conceptions. In the final part, I will offer a general account of how non-inferential mathematical knowledge resulting from implicit definitions is best conceived which avoids these shortcomings. (shrink)

This article explores the links between psychology – specifically, psychological needs, motivations, and coping mechanisms – and the sales of backlist titles during the COVID-19 pandemic. It shows how select titles on spirituality as well as The Boy, the Mole, the Fox and the Horse by Charlie Mackesy and Man’s Search for Meaning by Viktor E. Frankl help readers to attribute meaning to the pandemic and in turn, to cope with the struggles of the pandemic. The article concludes that such (...) books are connected by their psychological value to readers – the psychological needs they fulfil – and that books from disparate genres and on varying topics can help readers cope in similar ways. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss two passages in Plato’s Phaedo : 91e–92e, i. e. the first argument Socrates uses against Simmias’ contention that the soul is a harmony ; 74e–75c, which is a part of the recollection argument. The aim in discussing these two passages is to show that Plato allows his characters, Socrates and Simmias, to pursue different strategies in the argument, based on different levels of understanding. I further argue that reading the passages mentioned as dialectical games involving (...) two personae shows that a certain doctrine attributed to Plato, i. e. the so-called theory of recollection, was not in fact part of Plato’s philosophical creed. (shrink)

The paper argues that it is a mistake to turn Plato into an enemy of the many. The passage Rep. VI, 493e-494a belongs to a criticism of special circumstances, i. e. the Athenian democracy, it cannot be used to infer a principled stand against democratic ideas as such. My main argument is based on Rep. VI, 499d-500a, a passage where Socrates does speak his mind an warns explicitly against a contempt of the many.

This paper argues that Socrates’ second definition of figure in Plato’s Meno (76a5–7) is deliberately insufficient: It states only a necessary condition for something’s being a figure, not a condition that is necessary as well as sufficient. For although it is true that every figure (in plane geometry) is (or corresponds to) a limit of a solid, not every limit of solid is a figure, i.e. not if the solid has a curved surface. It is argued that this mistake is (...) one Meno was meant to detect, since one of the three concepts he has been asked to agree to beforehand (75e1–76a3), namely the concept ‘plane’, has not been used in the definition. If this concept is put to work, we get a proper definition of figure, i. e. figure is the plane limit of a solid. Meno’s failure shows that he did not grasp the import of Socrates’ first definition of figure (at 75b9–1), and hence not what this example was meant to show him on a definition generally. Socrates’ first account of figure did indeed state a proper definition of figure, taking the definiens to be a necessary as well as a sufficient condition for the definiendum, as shown by the two words standing in for quantifiers, ‘only’ and ‘always’. Some general lessons about the importance of the dramatic elements in a Platonic dialogue are drawn from this interpretation. (shrink)

E j lemmon, B a o williams, Bas van fraassen, And ruth marcus have argued on behalf of the existence of moral dilemmas, I.E., Cases where an agent is subject to conflicting absolute moral obligations. The paper criticizes this support and contends that no moral dilemma is possible.

Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock's critical introduction to the philosophy of Gottlob Frege is based on twenty-five years of teaching Frege's philosophy at the University of Puerto Rico. It developed from an earlier publication by Rosado Haddock on Frege's philosophy which was, however, available only in Spanish. This introduction to Frege is meant to steer a path between the two main approaches to Frege studies: on the one hand, we have interpretations of Frege which portray him as a neo-Kantian and thus (...) as some kind of idealist; on the other, we have writings like those of Dummett in which Frege is portrayed as a type of ‘philosophical Adam’, i.e., as completely separated from his philosophical tradition. Rosado Haddock succeeds in placing Frege's thinking into a broader philosophical context — mainly by reference to his contemporary Edmund Husserl — while also avoiding a Kantian reading of Frege's work.The structure of the book follows Frege's writing chronologically. In this way, Rosado Haddock leads the reader through the whole of Frege's philosophy while highlighting important changes and developments in Frege's thought from the Begriffsschrift to his Grundgesetze and other later writings. Chapter 1 introduces us to the core philosophical themes of Frege's Begriffsschrift with a special emphasis on Frege's notions of ‘conceptual content’ and ‘judgeable content’. Here, Rosado Haddock anticipates further discussion and points towards changes and developments of Frege's core notions of ‘identity’, ‘function’, and ‘content’. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on Frege's Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Chapter 2 discusses Frege's methodological principles as outlined in Frege's introduction and his criticisms of psychological, naturalistic, and Kantian approaches to the philosophy of mathematics. Chapter 3 focuses exclusively on Frege's own logicist account of arithmetic while emphasizing differences between Frege's views and Kantian …. (shrink)

While examples of bacteria benefiting eukaryotes are increasingly documented, studies examining effects of eukaryote hosts on microbial fitness are rare. Beneficial bacteria are often called “mutualistic” even if mutual reciprocity of benefits has not been demonstrated and despite the plausibility of other explanations for these microbes' beneficial effects on host fitness. Furthermore, beneficial bacteria often occur in diverse communities, making mutualism both empirically and conceptually difficult to demonstrate. We suggest reserving the terms “mutualism” and “parasitism” for pairwise interactions where the (...) relationship is largely independent of other species and can be verified by measuring the fitness effect experienced by both partners. In hosts with diverse microbial communities, we propose re‐formulating some of the essential questions of symbiosis research – e.g. concerning specificity, transmission mode, and common evolutionary fates – as questions of community ecology and ecosystem function, allowing important biological interactions to be investigated without making assumptions about reciprocity. Understanding the fitness of host‐associated bacteria is a crucial component of investigations into the role of microbes in eukaryote evolution. (shrink)

A state's foreign policy is constrained by parameters that inhere in the structure of the international system and in the nation's own political‐constitutional, social, and economic systems. The latter, domestic parameters, include “public opinion.” Because the public is largely ignorant of foreign affairs, policy‐making elites have wide scope for acting more rationally than would otherwise be possible, although public opinion operates on the second‐order effects of foreign policy (e.g., taxes, casualties)—inviting mismatches of objectives and means. The prevalent nonrational theories of (...) foreign‐policy derivation are themselves largely ignorant of the dominantly rational processes of the state, particularly in its foreign and military functions. (shrink)

The article demonstrates that the dominance approach—often used for the measurement of welfare in a population in which there are different household types (see e.g., Atkinson and Bourguignon, Arrow and the foundations of the theory of economic policy, 350–370, 1987)—can be based on explicit value judgments on the households’ living standard. We define living standard by equivalent income (functions) and consider classes of inequality averse social welfare functions: Welfare increases if the inequality of living standard is decreased. In this framework, (...) we suggest three new dominance criteria and obtain characterizations of second degree stochastic dominance and of two criteria proposed by Bourguignon (Journal of Econometrics 42:67–80, 1989). (shrink)